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POST-ZIONISM AND ALIYAH: OBSERVATIONS 
ON RECENT IMMIGRANTS FROM ETHIOPIA 
AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION IN ISRAEL 
 
 
 
 
 
This article examines two groups that have arrived in Israel since the 80’s, 
Jews from Ethiopia, numbering today over 65,000, and Jews from the former 
Soviet Union, close to 722,000 of whom have arrived since 1989. They will 
most likely represent the last major immigration waves to Israel of the twentieth 
century. I will endeavor to show in what ways these two groups take part in 
Israeli society, how they have developed diverging models of ethnicity, and how 
they challenge certain basic foundations of Zionism
1
. 
The first part of this article compares assimilation processes and segregation 
strategies in the Ethiopian and Russian communities in Israel, by looking at 
features such as native language, communal organization and political 
involvement. 
Part two focuses on the various ways of reconstructing ethnicities for the two 
groups in Israel, given that they are considered “identical” to the host population 
because of a common Jewish heritage, but have developed ways of being 
“different.” 
I attempt to show that these recent immigrants have not only reshaped 
contemporary Israeli society and perhaps even changed the meaning of being 
“Israeli,” but have also challenged the assumptions and purposes of a Jewish 
State in the aftermath of the growing immigration of Russian Christians and 
                                                     
1
 The term “Ethiopians” and “Russians” follows the Hebrew usage, etiopim and russim, 
even though I am aware of their limitations as well as the generalization they imply, 
given that I am dealing with such heterogeneous groups. Ethiopian Jews originate both 
from Tigray and Gondar provinces and immigrated in very different conditions while the 
Russian immigrants are composed of Jews from the Caucasus, Central Asia and Ukraine, 
for example. 
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“Ethiopian Jewish converts.” The recent immigrants from Ethiopia and the 
former Soviet Union may well constitute the first trend in post-Zionist alyot, 
which will doubtless have implications for the Israeli State at the start of a new 
millennium. 
I- Participating in Israel society: between assimilation and segregation 
At first glance, Ethiopians and Russians in Israel appear to represent two 
extremes. The former is a rural illiterate population from the northern Ethiopian 
highlands who has maintained a strong religious and ethnic identity; the latter is 
a mainly urban, highly educated population, who could not always preserve 
religious practices under the Russian communist regime. Because of these 
characteristics, diverging absorption policies were applied to each group by the 
Israeli authorities: 
- Ethiopians immigrants remained for at least one year (but often more) 
in an absorption center (merkaz klita), following an “indirect absorption.” 
They also received special mortgages to purchase apartments and 
affirmative action is being enforced in some institutions of higher 
education. These decisions were often tainted with paternalism and 
ethnocentrism. 
- “Direct absorption” was applied to the Russian immigrants; i.e., upon 
their arrival they received an “absorption basket” (sa’al klita) which 
included an allowance for living costs, rental and mortgage subsidies, and 
educational expenses (for children). This enabled them to make use of this 
money to find housing, purchase goods and basically survive on their own, 
instead of the government managing their needs. This policy was assumed 
to increase the immigrant’s choice in terms of where s/he wanted to live 
and freedom as regards how this financial assistance is managed (S. Adier, 
1998). Although they received these benefits, Russians were not treated 
with the “positive discrimination” reserved for the Ethiopians, especially in 
the area of housing
2
. 
Furthermore, the presence of a community of vatikim (veteran immigrants) 
from the USSR as well as from Ethiopia, who had set up communal structures, 
helped the newcomers upon arrival and eased their absorption process. Do these 
different integration dynamics suggest that each group will participate 
                                                     
2
 I am only referring here to the recent wave of immigrants from the former Soviet 
Union, who began to arrive in 1989, and not to the first immigration of the 70’s, whose 
socio-demographic features and motivations were vastly different and whose absorption 
was also handled differently, cf. S. Adier (1998). 
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differently in Israeli polity and social life? 
Native language Status 
Both Russian and Amharic show signs of ethnolinguistic vitality in Israel, as 
exemplified in the media (TV, radio, press), circulation of videotapes and music 
cassettes from Ethiopia and the former Soviet Union, and certain educational 
frameworks (e.g. Russian classes, an Amharic language test for the matriculation 
exam). In particular, the development of a Russian-language press, numbering 
some 50 newspapers and magazines, constitutes one of the most important 
features characterizing this immigration (N. Zilberg, 1996). These enable the 
older generation to maintain their native language, which results in segregated 
speech communities. Ethiopian youngsters all speak Hebrew among themselves, 
whereas young people from the former Soviet Union prefer to use Russian, even 
though they learn Hebrew successfully (E. Ben-Rafael et al. 1998). This is 
probably due to the fact that their Russian cultural, social and linguistic identity 
still prevails. 
Communal organization 
Both groups have tight networks of associations and organizations that help 
the community members, defend their rights, and encourage collective action. 
Concurrently, a class of new leaders has emerged. The number of Ethiopian 
associations has skyrocketed to nearly 100, set up by young leaders who 
skillfully stage strikes and demonstrations (such as the one directed against the 
Rabbinate in 1985 or in response to the blood scandal in 1996). Among the Jews 
from the former Soviet Union, approximately 35 associations exist. Each 
community has an umbrella organization, which is either the Zionist Forum of 
Soviet Jewry or the United Ethiopian Jewish Organization. In this sense, Russian 
and Ethiopian Jews, who lacked any communal structure or community leaders 
in their countries of origin, are now organized as a community that can bring 
about group mobilization at each new crisis. 
Political involvement 
Both immigrant groups were highly visible in the last elections (1996) and 
their needs were also taken into account in the Israeli political platforms. 
However, each group chose a different political forum: 
The Russians established their own political party (Israel b’Aliyah) of which 
two candidates were appointed to key positions in the current government: 
Nathan Sharansky, was named Minister of Commerce & Industry, and Yuli 
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Edelstein, Minister of Immigration & Absorption
3
. 
The Ethiopians, on the other hand, preferred to cast their votes mainly for the 
national-religious parties, at the right of the political spectrum, even though the 
first Ethiopian to become a Member of the Knesset, Addisu Messale, was 
elected on the Labor (Avoda) list. 
These patterns are informative as to ethnicity in politics. On the basis of 
E. Ben-Rafael’s (1982) classification of former immigrant waves, Russians can 
be classified as a “for-itself” group, developing a community of interests and a 
political consciousness, thus institutionalizing ethnicity in the polity. On the 
other hand, the Ethiopians form an “in-itself” group, unwilling to articulate an 
ethnic political ticket, leading to their marginalization in the political sphere. 
However, both groups demonstrated that they were at the center of power, and 
not at its periphery, and that they weigh heavily on government policies and 
national decision-making. 
Despite the dissimilarities between Ethiopians and Russians, both groups use 
the same methods of involvement in Israeli society to simultaneously maintain 
segregation and pursue assimilation
4
. In other words, from the point of view of 
native language, communal organization and political involvement, the two 
groups view themselves as ethnic communities (which was never the case 
before) and are perceived by the Israelis as such. Nevertheless, these are also the 
very strategies allowing them to fully enter Israeli society. In sum, by behaving 
as “ethnics,” they are becoming Israelis. However, while these patterns of 
participating “ethnically” in Israeli society demonstrate that Russians and 
Ethiopians wish to form separate communities, how does this affect the interplay 
between formations of Israeli identity and ethnic identity? 
II- Choosing new models of ethnicity 
In the Israel of the 90’s there are various ways of negotiating and 
reconstructing ethnicities. Emphasis here will be on development of self concept 
and representations of the Other as they are reformulated by the Ethiopian Jews 
and the Jews from the former Soviet Union when faced with their “other-self”, 
i.e. the Israeli Jew, deemed “identical” in theory but very “different” in practice. 
                                                     
3
 Reflecting the reality of the immigrant population today, an Israeli of Ethiopian origin 
was made Vice-Minister of Immigration and Absorption. 
4
 In fact, cultural assimilation and heightened ethnicity are quite compatible trends as 
shown in various studies of immigrant groups in Israel in the 80’s cf. A. Weingrod 
(1985). 
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The myth of the melting pot 
Over the last several decades, the melting-pot model of immigrant 
“absorption” in Israel has been challenged, mainly due to two factors. First, the 
Zionist ideal of the fusion of exiles (mizug galuyot) into a homogenous society 
with one national and cultural identity (i.e. that of the “Jewish people”) has 
failed, since the gap between the “two Israels” has in fact widened. Secondly, 
the olim of today, as opposed to those of the 50’s and 60’s, are no longer willing 
to give up their ethnic specificities. Therefore, today’s immigrants fully 
participate in Israeli life without the resocialization required in the 50’s, as new 
patterns of ethnic legitimation insure membership in Israeli society, leading to an 
era of cultural pluralism (E. Cohen, 1983). In the past, most immigrant groups 
aspired to assimilate as quickly as they could and become “Israelis.” Today, 
recent immigrants tend to strive to remain “ethnics” as long as they can. In this 
case, then, what are the signs of Otherness? How are the boundaries of the group 
redefined? How do these “new ethnicities” co-exist with national Israeli 
identity? 
Ethiopian Jews’ identification with a Black transnational culture 
In conjunction with secularization and modernity, Ethiopian Jews are 
growing more aware of their black identity among the white host population, in 
a way re-discovering their blackness or their negritude (L. Anteby, 1997). For 
instance, in both the political arena and the media, there are new political uses of 
the term “blackness” and references to the language of racial relations, usually to 
condemn Israeli policies as “discrimination” or “racism.” This reformulation of 
ethnicity is also apparent among a minority of the youth who adopt Afro-
American models and international black symbols (in their music, hairstyle, and 
clothing). Frequent trips to Addis Ababa and its urban African culture also 
account for this forging of a new collective identity. This trend may very well 
represent a means of negotiating their blackness in a white Jewish Israeli 
society. 
Russian Jews’ association with “high culture” 
The immigrants from the former Soviet Union continue to transmit and re-
create Russian culture and language, especially since it is the only means for the 
intellectual elite, the intelligentsia, to maintain any kind of identity5. A new 
community of “Russian-speaking Jews in Israel” has developed who wish to 
maintain an image of elitists and cosmopolitans (D. Storper Perez, 1998). In fact 
                                                     
5 B. Kimmerling calls this group “Russian-speaking immigrants” and considers them 
primarily as a linguistic-cultural group rather than an ethnic group per se (1998: 270). 
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they view themselves as belonging to a “high culture,” seen as superior to both 
Western culture and even to Israeli culture, dismissed as “Oriental” 
(B. Kimmerling, 1998. Russian-language media plays a major role in creating 
this trend, as do numerous ties with the homeland and with Russian Jews in New 
York or Berlin. This new “Russian ethnicity” and culture have become a mode 
of identification, even among youth, and is interpreted by Israelis as 
ghettoization and cultural separatism. 
Being an oleh in a global world 
These two examples suggest that one set of determinants making up personal 
identity derive from the country of origin. Immigrants still maintain strong 
bonds through modern media and travel. In some cases, such as the Russian 
immigrants, immigrants still actively participate in their former society. These 
transnational networks and cultural flows allow for a circulation of commodities 
and people, books and images, music and food between Israel and Ethiopia or 
the Russian communities in Germany, the United States, and the former Soviet 
Union. The second set of determinants derives from more global models, 
conveyed by modern media such as cable TV and music culture. This has 
enabled a certain number of Ethiopian immigrants to feel that they belong to a 
new “imagined community” of Blacks around the world. 
Thus people can live in Israel today and still be “Russian” or Ethiopian” in 
addition to the other identities they choose. New ethnic options, such as 
identifying as “blacks” or associating with “high culture” may perhaps become 
the main features of the immigrants’ “visibility” and their principal strategies of 
differentiation from the host population. Nonetheless, the interplay between the 
local Israeli context, the former society of origin, and the global dimension of 
“world culture” should not be interpreted as a sign of the failure of their 
absorption. On the contrary, I would suggest that these trends may well represent 
a new form of participation in Israeli society, which combines Israeli and global 
identities. The immigrants’ success in integrating into global culture may simply 
prove they have integrated into Israeli culture, thus confirming that they may 
truly be post-modern before their time. 
III- Challenging the Zionist goal 
The new twists the immigrants add to the meaning of “being an Israeli” also 
entail a reformulation of Israeli identity, and thus inevitably of Jewish identity 
itself. In other words, are these immigrant groups also defining new modes of 
“being a Jew”? 
In fact, both immigrants from Ethiopia and from the former Soviet Union 
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face difficulties in defining their personal status as Jews. Their arrival has 
rekindled the eternal debate on “who is a Jew?” which has taken on a new 
dimension in light of the high percentage of Russian Christian immigrants and of 
the controversy over the “Ethiopian Jewish converts”, otherwise known as 
Falash Mura. These “marginal groups” challenge the very text of the Law of 
Return and the Zionist goal itself. 
The text of the Law of Return, adopted in 1950, stipulates that “any Jew has 
the right to immigrate to Israel”. The 1970 amendment to the Law of Return 
extends this right to family members of a Jew, who can benefit from the rights 
given to a Jew, provided they have not converted to another religion: 
- article 4 (a). The rights of close kin 
The rights of a Jew according to the present law, the rights of the Oleh 
according to the 1952 law on nationality, as well as the rights of the Oleh 
according to any legislation that may be, are also granted to the child and 
the grandchild of a Jew, to the spouse of a Jew, to the spouse of the child 
or the grandchild of a Jew, except a person who was a Jew and willingly 
converted to another religion. 
- article 4 (b). Definition 
For the purpose of this law, a “Jew” means a person born to a Jewish 
mother or who has converted to Judaism, and who is not a member of 
another religion. 
Therefore, offspring of mixed marriages and descendants of Jews, who might 
all be Christians, are allowed to immigrate to Israel under the law of Return (hoq 
hashuout). Nonetheless, membership in “another religion” is sufficient to nullify 
the ancestral rights by virtue of Jewish descent, thus annulling the right of these 
individuals to immigrate according to the Law of Return. Since the “Jew” 
receives a secular definition in the Law of Return rather than a strictly Halakhic 
one, the extension of this Law to certain non-Jews brings up the question of the 
right of Return for descendants of apostates. For example, according to Jewish 
Law (Halakhah), apostasy does not put an end to Jewish affiliation, whereas 
under the Law of Return, descendants of apostates are not considered eligible for 
immigration6. Few immigrant groups in the past have challenged this ruling but 
the recent immigration from Ethiopia and the former Soviet Union, which 
includes former Christians or even practicing Christians, have once again 
                                                     
6 For a discussion on this topic, see M. Corinaldi (1998: 35-45). 
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brought these dilemmas to the fore7. 
The Russian Christian immigrants 
The Russian immigrants as a whole are generally considered to be a “Jewish 
community”, but in the latest immigration wave (since 1989) an increasing 
number of non-Jews are also entering Israel. These may be spouses of Jews, 
given the high number of mixed marriages in the former Soviet Union, as well 
as family members of a non-Jewish spouse. However, there is also a minority of 
Soviet Jews who converted to Christianity in the 60’s and 70’s, a phenomenon 
that seems to be restricted to certain urban centers (Moscow and Leningrad), 
mostly among the intelligentsia. One of the most well known examples of this is 
Father Mann, a priest of Jewish origin who converted to Christianity and leads a 
Church in the former Soviet-Union, mainly attended by other converts. An 
additional problem that also contributes to inflating the figures concerning non-
Jewish Russians relates to their personal status in terms of Jewish Law, since it 
is estimated that 27 % of Russian immigrants to Israel are not considered Jews 
according to Halakhah. Because Jews in the Soviet Union could not perform 
some religious prescriptions (in terms of marriage, divorce, circumcisions), the 
Israeli Rabbinate has ruled that some of the olim or their children must undergo 
a conversion ceremony in order to be able to marry in Israel or to prevent a child 
from being regarded as a mamzer in the eyes of the religious authorities8. 
The Falash Mura 
The entire community of Ethiopian Jews was recognized in 1975 as 
descendants of the tribe of Dan, and thus considered as “full-fledged Jews” who 
could benefit from the Law of Return. However, because the code of Jewish law 
(Halakhah) was unknown in Ethiopia, marriage, divorce and conversions were 
not performed according to normative Judaism and some individuals still 
                                                     
7 The famous case of the late Brother Daniel Rufeisen challenged this law when he 
claimed Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return as a Jew (by birth), even though he 
had converted to Christianity. The Israeli Supreme Court ruled (on Dec. 6th 1962) that 
the Law of Return, being a secular law, should be interpreted according to secular 
criteria. This resulted in a strange paradox: despite the fact that in the eyes of the 
Halakha, a Jew, even converted, remains a Jew, in the secular interpretation mentioned, 
Brother Daniel was not recognized as a Jew, and therefore could not benefit from the 
Law of Return (C. Klein, 1977: 43). 
8 According to Jewish law, a marmer, or illicit child, is the offspring of an “adulterous” 
mother, such as a woman who has not obtained a religious divorce before having 
children with another man. 
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undergo ritual immersion before marrying in Israel9. 
The Falash Mura, on the other hand, are Christian Ethiopians of Jewish 
descent who form a large community of converts, their number ranging from 
30,000 to 250,000. Although conversions had taken place for centuries, a group 
of “Falasha Christians”, known today as Falash Mura only emerged in the 19th 
century. Some converted to Christianity under the influence of European 
Protestant missionaries while others assimilated into the dominant Amhara 
population, becoming members of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church (Kaplan, 
1993). Nonetheless, none of these conversions were forced conversions but 
rather stemmed from personal choices to have educational opportunities or to 
achieve higher social and economic status. The converts continued to be 
regarded as ethnically different by the Christian Ethiopians at the same time as 
they maintained links with family members who remained Jewish. 
In 1991, when 14,000 Ethiopian immigrants were airlifted to Israel in the 
dramatic “Operation Solomon”, only a few Falash Mura were among them. 
Since then, their right to immigrate has been a subject of controversy. In 1993, 
an Inter-Ministerial Committee – known as the “Tsaban Committee” – examined 
the case of the Falash Mura, but saw no possibility of granting them the 
privileges of the Law of Return as a group since they were deemed “members of 
another religion.” In the eyes of the committee, their continued practice of 
Christianity defined them as “free-will converts.” However, on humanitarian 
grounds, it was recommended that they be reunited with first-degree relatives. 
Most of them have close family in Israel and since mid-1993 they have been 
entering the country on the basis of family reunification under the Law of Entry 
(hoq haknisa) and not the Law of Return (hoq hashvout) only applied to those 
recognized as Jews10. Upon arrival, they follow a three-week “return to Judaism” 
course (ha’shava le yahadout) and are formally converted. By Rabbinical 
standards, as apostates reconverting “back” to Judaism, they are treated as 
repentants and not as converted gentiles. They thus undergo a shortened 
rabbinical process of reconversion (including re-circumcision, ritual immersion 
and acceptance of the commandments in the presence of three rabbis acting as a 
religious court, a bet-din rabbani)11. 
                                                     
9 Up to 1985, a longer form of symbolic conversion (giyur le-humra), including re-
circumcision (hatafat dam brit), ritual immersion and acceptance of the commandments 
was required to remove any doubt concerning the personal status of Ethiopian 
immigrants. 
10 As of June 1998, over 7,000 Falash Mura have entered Israel. 
11 Cf. M. Corinaldi (1998: 136-139). 
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The presence of these immigrants in the midst of the olim serves to illustrate 
that the boundaries of Jewishness and the limits of who has the right to 
immigrate are being extended. This is resulting in a broader definition of who is 
a Jew and by extension who will become an Israeli (or at least who will be living 
in Israel as an Israeli). In fact, these groups on the fringes of Judaism are 
redefining Ole contours of Israeli society by widening its borders, a first step 
towards normalcy, and perhaps post-Zionism. 
Conclusion 
Both the crumbling Zionist ideology in Israel itself as well as the 
characteristics of the Russian and Ethiopian immigrants (i.e. the social and 
political ways they take part in Israeli society, the ethnic options they choose in 
relation to global identities, and the fact they are not always halakhic Jews) 
account for some of these new patterns in Israeli society and identity. These 
“New Israelis” are developing distinct cultures and identities, which constitute 
quasi-autonomous entities; they have developed symbolic separations (low rate 
of intermarriage, segregated housing, different languages, different lifestyles) 
that challenge the very definition of “Israeli culture” and “Israeli identity” 
(B. Kimmerling, 1998: 264-265). This trend also undermines the “cultural and 
hegemonic domination” of the Zionist State, because ethnic particularities are 
emphasized. 
Can these immigrants be defined as post-modern olim? Although they have 
taken on a new Israeli identity, their immigration has also enabled them to 
construct new ethnicities and new forms of identification that are not connected 
to Israel or to the Zionist model (but rather to the US or to urban Africa). In this 
sense, they are combining different cultural references and multiple identities, a 
definite component of post-modernism. 
Can these immigrants be defined as post-Zionist olim? In fact, there has been 
an ideological shift in Israel and several researchers have claimed that the 
country is becoming a post-Zionist society, since the goals of Zionism are no 
longer being fulfilled. The “post-Zionization” of society, as U. Ram (1998) sees 
it, is expressed in the diversification of the collective ideology and the 
broadening of the limits of membership in Israeli society. This, of course, 
undermines the very meaning of aliyah: for what does it mean to be an oleh in a 
post-Zionist era? 
Can these immigrants be defined simply as migrants as in any other Western 
country? In this case, aliyah (“ascension”) is on the way to becoming hagira 
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(immigration), if this has not already happened12. The issue of the integration of 
the non-Jewish Russians or Ethiopians also raises the question of what it means 
for Israeli society to deal with migrants instead of olim. This would attest to the 
normalization of the country, making Israel a country of immigration like most 
Western countries (Berthomière, 1996). 
These questions remain open, as do the implications of these diverging 
definitions of the immigrants for the boundaries of Israeli society in the future 
and for Jewish identity in Israel. 
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